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 THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: 
CALCULATING THE “HOURS OF SERVICE” FOR 
THE REINSTATED EMPLOYEE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) has drawn the following 
commentary by at least one prominent labor and employment lawyer: ―I really 
don‘t think there‘s a law out there that is more confusing and causes more 
problems for employers than Family Leave.‖1  Some of the confusion 
experienced by employers involves the interpretation of the language of the 
FMLA.  However, the problems associated with the FMLA are not limited to 
employers, but involve employees and their rights under the FMLA.  
Although the FMLA has been in effect for approximately fifteen years, the 
law is still unsettled as to how to interpret the ―hours worked‖ language of the 
FMLA as it applies to a reinstated employee.  The following case is an 
example of the problem facing employers, employees, and courts. 
Mr. Robert Steele, a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) worker, was 
indefinitely suspended and eventually discharged from his employment in 
February 2005.
2
  After a grievance and arbitration hearing, the arbitrator 
found that the CTA had no cause to fire Mr. Steele, so Mr. Steele was 
reinstated to his former position.
3
  The CTA fully reimbursed Mr. Steele for 
the pay he would have earned during his discharge.
4
  Mr. Steele returned to 
his former position in November 2005.
5
 
Then, in April 2006, Mr. Steele applied for leave under the FMLA to care 
for his asthmatic wife, but the CTA denied his request on the basis that Mr. 
 
1. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, 20% of Employers Violate FMLA, Study Concludes, NEWHOUSE 
NEWS SERVICE, May 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.newhouse.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=51901 (quoting Richard 
Meneghello, a partner in the Portland, Oregon, office of Fisher & Phillips, a national employment 
law firm).  The article reports that one in five U.S. employers violates the FMLA, according to a 
report by the Families and Work Institute.  Id.  The potential for confusion in adhering to the 
FMLA‘s rules has led to proposed changes to the FMLA rules now pending at the Labor Department.  
Id. (citing Lisa Horn, a manager of health care for the Society for Human Resource Management in 
Alexandria, Virginia). 
2. Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 9, 2007). 
3. Id. at *2–3. 
4. Id. at *3. 
5. Id.  Mr. Steele was employed as a bus operator.  Id. 
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Steele had not worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for FMLA leave.
6
  
While Mr. Steele‘s FMLA application was pending, his wife suffered severe 
asthma attacks, requiring Mr. Steele to miss four days from work.
7
  The CTA 
disciplined Mr. Steele for his unauthorized absences.
8
  If Mr. Steele had not 
been discharged without cause during the previous twelve months, he would 
have worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for FMLA leave.
9
  Mr. 
Steele‘s experience raises the question: When an employee has been 
wrongfully discharged and then reinstated, should the hours the employee 
would have worked, but for the wrongful termination, count toward the 1250 
hours required to qualify for FMLA leave?  Although the FMLA nears its 
fifteenth anniversary,
10
 courts have yet to resolve this question. 
The FMLA provides for an employee to take up to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave in a calendar year for health-related or family-related reasons if 
the employee qualifies for the leave by working 1250 hours in the twelve 
months prior to the leave request.
11
  There has been some confusion as to how 
courts define the hours of service requirement when an employee has been 
wrongfully suspended, laid off, or terminated (and then reinstated) within the 
twelve months prior to the leave request.  The Sixth Circuit has held that the 
hours the employee ―would have‖ worked count toward the requisite 1250 
hours, as part of a ―make whole‖ award when reinstating a wrongfully 
terminated employee.
12
  However, the First Circuit has used the Fair Labor 
Standards Act‘s (FLSA) definition of ―work‖ to determine that if an employee 
was not actually working, hours he would have worked do not count toward 
the 1250 hours required for FMLA leave.
13
 
This Comment argues that the hours an employee would have worked 
during a wrongful termination should count toward the hours needed for 
FMLA leave.  In Part II, this Comment gives a brief history of the FMLA.  
Also, Part II outlines the requirements that need to be met for an employee to 
qualify for FMLA leave.  Part III goes on to discuss the conflicting case law 
interpreting the hours worked language of the FMLA as it relates to the 
reinstated employee after a wrongful termination or suspension. 
 
6. Id.  Mr. Steele was discharged from full-time employment on February 10, 2005, and 
reinstated to his former position on November 18, 2005.  Id. at *2–3. 
7. Id. at *3. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at *4.  If Mr. Steele had worked during the time he was discharged, he would have 
worked forty-one weeks and a total of 1640 hours.  Id. at *5.  Even adjusting that time for vacations, 
absences, and holidays, Mr. Steele would have worked the minimum 1250 required hours.  Id. 
10. The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (Supp. V 1993)). 
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A), 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
12. See Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2004). 
13. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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Next, Part IV argues the necessity of including the hours an employee 
would have worked during the termination or suspension when calculating 
whether the employee qualifies for FMLA leave.  This argument is premised, 
in part, on the common law and developing labor relations law that require 
that an award of damages is limited to the amount that would make the injured 
party whole.  An employee arguably is not made whole without crediting the 
hours that would have been worked.  This argument is also premised on the 
fact that the FLSA is a remedial statute that courts are directed to look to for 
guidance when interpreting the FMLA‘s language.  In particular, because the 
FLSA was designed with a humanitarian purpose, any ambiguities in its 
language should be interpreted in favor of the employee, including the hours 
worked language of the FMLA.  Additionally, public policy favors 
interpreting the FMLA to include the hours an employee would have worked 
because the needs of workers and their families should be protected in an ―at 
will‖ employment environment. 
Finally, Part V concludes by asserting that including the hours an 
employee would have worked is consistent with the goals of Congress when 
enacting the FMLA. 
II.  FMLA BACKGROUND 
The following background information regarding the FMLA is necessary 
to understand the source of confusion for courts in interpreting the hours 
worked requirement.  Congress passed the FMLA on February 3, 1993, and 
President Clinton signed it into law two days later.
14
  The FMLA was created 
in response to the needs of a growing number of single-parent households, 
households with working mothers, and the growing number of households 
with elderly persons.
15
 
The FMLA states that an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve 
work weeks of unpaid leave during any twelve-month period for certain 
family or medical reasons, including a serious health condition that makes the 
employee unable to perform the functions of his job.
16
  FMLA leave may be 
taken all at once or intermittently.
17
 
For an employee to be eligible for FMLA leave, he must have been 
employed by the employer for at least twelve months and worked at least 
1250 hours within the twelve months prior to the leave request.
18
  The 
 
14. Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, The Family and Medical Leave Act: Does it Make 
Unreasonable Demands on Employers?, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 135, 135–36 (1996). 
15. Id. at 135.  The FMLA went into effect for most employers on August 5, 1993.  Id. at 136. 
16. See § 2612(a)(1) (2000). 
17. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (2006). 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2000).  In addition, the FMLA applies only to employers with fifty 
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employer may request a supporting medical certification of the serious 
medical condition from the employee applying for leave.
19
  However, an 
employer is prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying an 
employee‘s exercise or attempted exercise of any FMLA right.20  The FMLA 
also prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating or retaliating 
against an employee for exercising an FMLA right.
21
  After the employee‘s 
qualified leave ends, the employee is entitled to reinstatement to the position 
held before the leave commenced, or an equivalent position with the same pay 
and benefits.
22
 
In the years since the FMLA was enacted, courts have interpreted the 
language of the FMLA to determine whether wrongfully terminated, and 
subsequently reinstated, employees should be able to count the hours they 
would have worked toward the calculation of the hours required to qualify for 
FMLA leave.  When faced with the interpretation of any statute, including the 
FMLA, courts must first look to the language of the statute when beginning 
the task of interpreting the meaning of specific phrases or words.
23
  The 
FMLA offers guidance by directing courts to look to the FLSA
24
 when 
interpreting the ―hours of service‖ requirement.25  When interpreting the 
language of the FMLA, courts must try to balance the interests of the 
employer with the needs of families when determining eligibility for FMLA 
leave.
26
  However, balancing the needs of families with the interests of 
employers has not brought all courts to the same conclusions, as Part III 
illustrates. 
III.  CONFLICTING CASE LAW INVOLVING THE HOURS OF SERVICE 
REQUIREMENT WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS WRONGFULLY TERMINATED AND 
THEN REINSTATED 
The cases in Part III illustrate how courts have disagreed in their attempts 
to interpret the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement.  In some cases, courts 
 
or more employees, within a seventy-five-mile radius, for each working day during each of twenty or 
more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.  Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii), (4)(A)(i).  
Some states, such as Connecticut, have lower threshold requirements for taking FMLA leave.  
Michael G. Petrie, There’s No Substitute for Hours Worked , 14 CONN. EMP. L. LETTER 3, May 2006.  
For instance, in Connecticut, an employee needs to work only 1000 hours, rather than 1250 hours, in 
the previous twelve months to qualify for leave.  Id. 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a)–(b) (2000). 
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000). 
21. Id. § 2615(a)(2). 
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). 
23. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 369 (1st Cir. 2002). 
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). 
26. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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have used the FLSA‘s interpretation of work to justify either allowing or 
disallowing the hours an employee would have worked but for a wrongful 
termination.
27
  In other cases, courts have balanced the interests of employers 
and employees when interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement to 
determine whether to include the hours an employee would have worked but 
for a wrongful termination.
28
  The First and Sixth Circuits have split as to 
whether to include hours an employee would have worked but for a wrongful 
termination, and each offers reasonable justification for its conclusions.
29
  One 
tribal court and several district courts have weighed in on this issue as well, 
with differing results.
30
  As the following case law demonstrates, the issue 
continues to polarize courts, employers, and employees. 
A.  The First Circuit Excludes Hours That an Employee Does Not Actually 
Work in Plumley v. Southern Container, Inc.
31
 
In Plumley, a case of first impression decided by the First Circuit, the 
plaintiff, John Plumley, was discharged from his job at Southern Container, 
Inc. (SCI), when he missed work to care for his ailing father.
32
  Plumley 
claimed that SCI violated his rights under the FMLA by firing him for taking 
leave to care for his sick father.
33
  SCI claimed that Plumley did not qualify 
for FMLA leave because he had not worked the requisite 1250 hours in the 
previous twelve months.
34
  In calculating the hours of service to qualify for 
 
27. See, e.g., Plumley, 303 F.3d at 369–70. 
28. See, e.g., Ricco, 377 F.3d at 603. 
29. See generally id. (holding that a reinstated employee is entitled to count the hours the 
employee would have worked to qualify for FMLA leave because otherwise the employee is not 
made whole); Plumley, 303 F.3d 364 (holding that the reinstated employee must actually work hours 
to qualify for leave because the wording of the FLSA requires such an interpretation). 
30. See generally Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-
181 (Mashantucket Pequot Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.tribal-
institute.org/opinions/2006.NAMP.0000002.htm (holding that an employee must actually work to be 
credited with hours that would make the employee eligible for family leave). 
31. 303 F.3d 364. 
32. Id. at 367.  Prior to missing work to care for his ill father, Plumley had been discharged in 
March 1998.  Id.  After following the company‘s grievance procedure and participating in arbitration, 
Plumley was reinstated with full pay and benefits for a six-month span of time during which he 
performed no work for SCI.  Id.  Once reinstated, the plant manager notified Plumley that Plumley 
needed to return to work on October 12, 1998.  Id.  Plumley had taken a job at a nightclub during the 
time he had been discharged and while he was awaiting the arbitral award and requested more time to 
find a replacement for himself at the nightclub.  Id. at 367 n.2.  The plant manager ―was unmoved by 
Plumley‘s plight.‖  Id.  Plumley reported for work on October 12, 1998, but left prior to the end of 
his shift.  Id. at 367.  The next day Plumley notified SCI that he would not be in for his shift because 
he was visiting his ill father at the hospital.  Id.  Plumley was fired upon his return to work on 
October 14 for abandoning his duties.  Id. 
33. Id. at 368. 
34. Id. 
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the FMLA leave, Plumley claimed that SCI did not include all the hours he 
should have been credited.
35
  Earlier in the year, prior to his discharge, 
Plumley had been wrongfully discharged, and after filing a grievance with the 
union and pursuant to an arbitral award, he was reinstated with pay for the 
hours he missed during the time he was wrongfully discharged.
36
  Plumley 
claimed that the hours for which he was paid pursuant to the arbitral award 
should count toward the hours of service for purposes of qualifying for FMLA 
leave.
37
 
The First Circuit determined that the resolution of the dispute hinged upon 
the interpretation of the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement.38  The court 
first looked to the language of the statute for guidance.
39
  Determining 
whether an employee has worked the required 1250 hours, the First Circuit 
noted that the FMLA directs courts to examine the principles established 
under the FLSA for determining compensable hours of work.
40
 
The First Circuit noted that the Supreme Court defined ―work‖ under the 
FLSA to mean ―physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) 
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily 
for the benefit of the employer.‖41  The court stated that this definition of 
―work‖ was the ―yardstick‖ by which courts should measure all FLSA 
claims.
42
 
In addition, the First Circuit looked at the plain and commonly understood 
meaning of the word ―work.‖  The court stated that ―courts should assume that 
Congress knew, and embraced, widely accepted legal definitions of specific 
words used in drafting particular statutes.‖43  The court went on to say that 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 367. 
37. Id. at 368. 
38. Id. at 369.  Plumley had only actually performed 851.25 hours of work for SCI in the 
previous twelve months prior to leaving to care for his sick father.  Id.  Without being credited with 
the hours he would have worked but for his six-month absence incurred during the arbitration and 
grievance procedure, he would not have qualified for FMLA leave.  See id. 
39. Id.  The court stated: 
 
Thus, statutory interpretation always begins with the text of the relevant 
statutes—and it sometimes ends there as well.  When the statutory language 
―points unerringly in a single direction, and produces an entirely plausible 
result, it is unnecessary—and improper—to look for other signposts or to 
browse in the congressional archives.‖   
Id. (quoting United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 370–71 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)). 
42. Id. at 371 n.4. 
43. Id. at 370 (citing United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
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―[f]or legal purposes, the standard definition of ‗employment‘ is ‗[w]ork for 
which one has been hired and is being paid by an employer.‘‖44  The court 
stated that ―work‖ was defined in its verb form, meaning to ―‗exert effort; to 
perform, either physically or mentally.‘‖45  Finally, the court concluded that: 
 
Merging these definitions into one coherent sentence, we find 
that the statutory language, in every technical sense, indicates 
that only those hours that an employer suffers or permits an 
employee to do work (that is, to exert effort, either physically 
or mentally) for which that employee has been hired and is 
being paid by the employer can be included as hours of 
service within the meaning of the FMLA.
46
 
 
In Plumley, the employee was denied FMLA leave because he did not 
meet the required 1250 hours within the previous twelve months.
47
  The First 
Circuit, using the Supreme Court‘s definition of ―work,‖ held that the required 
hours under the FMLA had to be hours ―actually worked,‖ rather than hours 
the employee could have worked but for the wrongful termination.
48
 
B.  Connecticut’s Tribal Court Follows the First Circuit’s Reasoning in 
Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise
49
 
In a subsequent case that followed the reasoning of the First Circuit, 
Barthelet v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, the court held that the 
wording of the FLSA required an employee to actually work to qualify for 
FMLA leave.  In Barthelet, the employee worked for the Foxwoods Resort 
and Casino.
50
  She was absent from work from December 25, 2000, to June 
11, 2001, on workers‘ compensation leave for neck and shoulder injuries.51  
After returning to work, she took additional time off from January 30, 2002, 
to February 10, 2002, for continued pain in her shoulder.
52
  Later that same 
year, she suffered from kidney stones, requiring an additional absence from 
work from February 13, 2002, to March 20, 2002.
53
  Although she requested 
 
44. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (7th ed. 1999)). 
45. Id. (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1599). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 372. 
48. Id. 
49. No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 (Mashantucket Pequot Mar. 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/2006.NAMP.0000002.htm. 
50. Petrie, supra note 17 (discussing Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 10). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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Family Medical Leave under the tribal policy
54
 twice during 2002, she was 
denied because she did not have the requisite 1250 hours accumulated to 
qualify for leave.
55
  Eventually, she was fired for excessive absences.
56
 
Barthelet appealed her dismissal, claiming that the Tribe should have 
granted her Family Medical Leave request.
57
  She further argued that her 
workers‘ compensation leave was a mitigating factor in her inability to work 
the requisite 1250 hours required for family leave.
58
  Barthelet, therefore, 
claimed that her being out on workers‘ compensation leave qualified as 
―hours worked‖ under the tribal Family Medical Leave policy.59 
The court looked to both the First Circuit‘s Plumley v. Southern 
Container, Inc.
60
 and the Sixth Circuit‘s Ricco v. Potter61 for guidance when it 
evaluated the plaintiff‘s claims because the Tribe‘s Family Medical Leave 
policy mirrored the FMLA‘s language.62  The court determined that the 
reasoning in Ricco, specifically that the hours an employee would have 
worked but for a wrongful termination or suspension should count toward the 
hours needed for FMLA leave, did not apply because the Tribe had not 
unlawfully terminated the plaintiff in Barthelet, and that the finding in Ricco 
was based upon the employee‘s unlawful termination.63  The court premised 
its conclusion by noting that the Ricco court stated that not including the 
hours the unlawfully terminated employee would have worked ―would 
‗reward employers for their unlawful conduct.‘‖64 
Then the Barthelet court stated that the First Circuit‘s definition of hours 
of service in Plumley was consistent with the Gaming Enterprise‘s exclusion 
of the workers‘ compensation leave hours in calculating the 1250 hours 
required for Family Medical Leave.
65
  The court also noted that the plain 
language of the FLSA, specifically the exclusions for illness, vacation, and 
holiday, from the hours of service definition, even when employees are paid 
 
54. Tribal Family Medical Leave follows federal law in that an eligible employee is one who 
has been employed at least twelve months and has worked at least 1250 hours during the previous 
twelve-month period.  Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 27. 
55. Petrie, supra note 17 (discussing Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181). 
56. Id. 
57. Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶ 10. 
58. Id. ¶ 11. 
59. Id. 
60. See 303 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2002); supra Part III.A. 
61. See 377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004); infra Part III.C. 
62. Barthelet, No. MPTC-CV-AA-2004-181 ¶¶ 27, 29. 
63. Id. ¶ 31. 
64. Id. (quoting Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
65. Id. ¶ 30. 
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for that time, did not support including the hours an employee spent on 
workers‘ compensation leave.66 
Even though the tribal court‘s decision is not binding on the state or 
federal courts in Connecticut, this decision may be indicative of how a similar 
case would be decided in Connecticut.
67
  This decision reflects the ―no work = 
no leave‖ line of thinking by some courts, and adds yet another twist to the 
knot of opinions surrounding the hours of service requirement of the FMLA.
68
 
C.  The Sixth Circuit Includes the Hours an Employee Would Have Worked in 
Ricco v. Potter
69
 
In Ricco v. Potter, the Sixth Circuit confronted the same task of 
interpreting the hours of service requirement of the FMLA but came to the 
opposite conclusion.
70
  In Ricco, the employee, after working for the United 
States Postal Service for approximately four and a half years, was issued a 
notice of removal that terminated her employment.
71
  The employee filed a 
grievance through her union, and after an arbitration hearing, her termination 
was converted into a thirty-work-day suspension.
72
  The award ordered the 
employee to be ―made whole,‖ including reinstatement, back pay, and ―full 
credit for years of service for seniority and pension purposes.‖73 
After being reinstated pursuant to the make-whole award, the employee 
required intermittent leaves of absence because she began to experience 
depression and migraines due to the death of her husband.
74
  Because of this 
health condition, the employee requested FMLA leave, but her employer 
denied her request and claimed she had not worked the required 1250 hours.
75
  
Consequently, the employee was issued another notice of removal for failing 
to keep a regular work schedule.
76
  Although the employee filed a grievance, 
claiming her FMLA rights had been violated, she was terminated, and the 
arbitrator stated that the arbitration hearing was not the proper forum to 
 
66. Id. ¶ 28. 
67. Petrie, supra note 18. 
68. See id. 
69. 377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004). 
70. See id. at 600. 
71. Id. at 600–01. 
72. Id. at 601. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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litigate any FMLA violations.
77
  The employee then commenced an action in 
federal court.
78
 
When the case went up on appeal,
79
 the Sixth Circuit looked to the FLSA 
to define the hours of service requirement of the FMLA.
80
  The court noted 
that the applicable subsection of the FLSA dealt with pay rates.
81
  The court 
pointed out that the FLSA specifically states that an employee‘s ―regular rate‖ 
of compensation does not include the following: 
 
payments made for occasional periods when no work is 
performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the 
employer to provide sufficient work, or other similar cause; 
reasonable payments for traveling expenses, or other 
expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance of his 
employer‘s interests and properly reimbursable by the 
employer; and other similar payments to an employee which 
are not made as compensation for his hours of 
employment[.]
82
 
 
The Sixth Circuit, interpreting the FLSA language, held that the FLSA 
phrase ―other similar cause‖ found in § 207 meant things like jury duty, 
inability of the employee to reach the workplace due to weather conditions, 
and a funeral of a family member, but not absences due to unlawful 
termination.
83
  Also, the court stated that although ―regular rate‖ excludes 
payment for certain periods where an employee performs no work due to 
certain causes, unlawful termination should not be considered one of the 
causes.
84
  The Sixth Circuit interpreted the FLSA‘s language not to exclude 
hours that would have been worked but for the employee‘s unlawful 
termination and held that the employee was entitled to include those hours 
when requesting FMLA leave.
85
  In Ricco, the employee argued that the court 
needed to include the hours an employee would have worked but for a 
wrongful termination in order to effectuate the FMLA‘s goal to balance the 
demands of the workplace with the needs of families and discourage 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. At the district level, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at 
Cleveland granted the employer‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), and the employee appealed.  Id. at 600. 
80. Id. at 604. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (2000)). 
83. Id. at 605. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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employers from terminating employees for the purpose of restricting 
employees‘ eligibility to take FMLA leave.86 
D.  The Eastern District of Arkansas Uses the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning to 
Deny Summary Judgment in Densmore v. Pilgrim‘s Pride Corp.87 
In Densmore, the case was before the court on a motion for summary 
judgment.
88
  The defendant denied the employee FMLA leave due to a 
shortage of the required ―hours of service.‖89  The employee claimed that she 
did not meet the 1250 hours required because she had been unlawfully 
suspended after an injury to her hand that required her to miss work and then 
had been reinstated.
90
  Months later, when she requested FMLA leave for her 
pregnancy, her employer denied her request.
91
  She was later fired for taking 
unauthorized leave.
92
  The court pointed out that a jury could find that the first 
unlawful termination constituted illegal interference with the employee‘s 
FMLA rights and may not be used as a justification for the second 
termination.
93
  The court, in denying the employer‘s summary judgment 
motion, went on to note that a jury could find that but for the unlawful 
suspension, the employee would have met the ―hours of service‖ requirement 
under the FMLA.
94
 
E.  The Northern District of Illinois Uses the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning to 
Determine an Employee’s FMLA Eligibility in Savage v. Chicago Transit 
Authority
95
 
In Savage v. Chicago Transit Authority,
96
 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed a motion to dismiss brought by 
the CTA.
97
  The CTA claimed that Mr. Steele was not an eligible employee 
because he had not worked the requisite 1250 hours to qualify for the FMLA; 
Mr. Steele argued that he would have worked the required hours but for his 
 
86. Id. at 603.  The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court to 
determine Ricco‘s eligibility for FMLA leave, directing the court to include the hours she would 
have worked but for her wrongful termination.  Id. at 606. 
87. No. 4:05CV00770-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82285 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2006). 
88. Id. at *1. 
89. Id. at *3–4. 
90. Id. at *2–3. 
91. See id. at *3–4. 
92. Id. at *3. 
93. Id. at *23–24. 
94. Id. 
95. No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007). 
96. See supra Part I (reviewing the facts of the case). 
97. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *1. 
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wrongful termination and subsequent reinstatement.
98
  The court stated that 
although the FMLA does not precisely define hours of service, it directs 
litigants to § 207 of the FLSA to determine whether an employee has met the 
hours of service requirement of the FMLA.
99
  The court observed that 
―[u]nder § 207 of the FLSA, the ‗regular rate at which an employee is 
employed shall be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid 
to, or on behalf of, the employee.‘‖100  The court then went on to note that Mr. 
Steele‘s allegations were factually analogous to the plaintiff‘s allegations in 
Ricco.
101
  The court stated that had the CTA credited the hours that Mr. Steele 
would have worked but for his wrongful discharge, he would have qualified 
for the FMLA leave, much like the plaintiff in Ricco.
102
 
The court went on to adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, stating that: 
 
―[T]he goal of a make-whole award is to put the 
employee in the same position that she would have been in 
had her employer not engaged in the unlawful conduct[;] this 
includes giving the employee credit towards the FMLA‘s 
hours-of-service requirement for hours that the employee 
would have worked but for her unlawful termination.‖103 
 
The court held that because of Mr. Steele‘s make-whole award, he was an 
eligible employee under the FMLA.
104
  In addition, the court found the 
reasoning in Plumley unpersuasive because the language of § 207 of the 
FLSA defines only the regular rate of compensation for an employee, not 
what constitutes ―work.‖105  The court went on to say that a person who 
receives a make-whole award pursuant to arbitration following wrongful 
discharge receives ―compensation‖ within the definition given in the FLSA.106 
IV.  THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING THE HOURS AN EMPLOYEE WOULD HAVE 
WORKED WHEN CALCULATING WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE QUALIFIES FOR 
FMLA LEAVE 
Although courts disagree on how to interpret the hours worked 
requirement, courts should interpret the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement 
 
98. Id. at *2. 
99. Id. at *4. 
100. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (2000)). 
101. Id. at *7. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. (quoting Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at *8. 
106. Id. at *8–9. 
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to include hours an employee would have worked but for the employer‘s 
unlawful termination for several important reasons.  First, when an employee 
has been wrongfully terminated and then reinstated pursuant to an employer‘s 
―make-whole‖ award, the only way an employee is truly made ―whole‖ is if 
the employee retains all the benefits he would have received had he never 
been wrongfully terminated.  Next, because an ambiguity exists in how the 
FMLA is defined by the FLSA, courts should resolve the confusion by 
creating a bright-line rule that in turn may reduce future litigation as it relates 
to this specific issue.  Finally, when balancing the needs of employers and 
employees when interpreting the FMLA, courts should include the hours an 
employee would have worked but for a wrongful termination for the purpose 
of prohibiting unlawful terminations of employees by employers who are 
looking to circumvent an employee‘s FMLA leave. 
A.  The Make-Whole Requirement 
One reason that courts should interpret the hours of service requirement to 
include hours a wrongfully terminated employee would have worked is to 
make an injured employee whole.  Many employers, such as the United States 
Postal Service in Ricco
107
 and the CTA in Savage,
108
 use labor arbitration to 
settle disputes between the labor force and management.
109
  Many collective 
bargaining contracts provide for grievance resolution through a formal 
process that concludes with binding arbitration.
110
  When parties empower an 
arbitrator to resolve the grievance, the arbitrator has the authority to grant 
relief for violations of the contract where the arbitrator finds the grievance has 
merit.
111
 
 Arbitrators have a broad scope of power to provide a remedy to 
disputing parties.
112
  However, the ordinary rule arbitrators follow comes from 
the common law and from the developing law of labor relations, specifically 
that an award of damages is limited to the amount that would make the injured 
party whole.
113
  Unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators follow this 
 
107. Ricco, 377 F.3d at 601. 
108. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2–3. 
109. See Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining 
Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 270, 271 (1982) (discussing the labor 
arbitration process). 
110. Id. 
111. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1200 (Alan 
Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003). 
112. Id.  In spite of this power to remedy disputes, arbitrators do not always award monetary 
damages for contract violations.  Id. at 1200–01.  In addition, arbitrators are often reluctant to offer 
compensation for time an employee has not worked.  Id. at 1201. 
113. Id. 
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rule.
114
  Attempting to make an injured party whole usually involves awarding 
―monetary damages to place the parties in the position they would have been 
in had there been no violation.‖115 
Make-whole awards can include monetary compensation for lost 
overtime, premium pay, and other types of special pay an employee may have 
been denied while he or she was laid off or fired.
116
  Awarding monetary 
compensation generally corresponds to the injured party‘s out-of-pocket 
expenses, as well as other money losses.
117
  However, remedial make-whole 
awards are not limited to monetary compensation alone.
118
  Some arbitrators 
award compensation other than money, such as academic credit, sick leave, or 
vacation time, as part of the make-whole award.
119
  In some cases, such as 
Ricco and Savage, employees have been reinstated with full benefits and back 
pay, as part of the make-whole award determined by arbitration.
120
 
In Ricco, the arbitrator ordered that Ricco was to be ―made whole.‖121  
The Sixth Circuit determined that excluding the hours that Ricco would have 
worked but for the wrongful termination would not make her ―whole‖; 
therefore, those hours must be included in the calculation of hours required 
for the subsequent FMLA leave request.
122
  Likewise, in Savage, the Northern 
District of Illinois determined that Steele, the employee, would not be made 
whole without crediting the hours Steele would have worked had he not been 
wrongfully discharged.
123
 
Courts should include the hours an employee would have worked if he 
had not been wrongfully discharged or terminated because to do so comports 
with the goal of making the wronged employee whole.  Monetary 
compensation alone seems inadequate in many instances, as demonstrated by 
the aforementioned case law.  To exclude the hours an employee would have 
worked from the FMLA eligibility calculation does not truly make the 
employee whole.  The hours an employee would have worked have value 
 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1202. 
116. Id.  An employee may be compensated for time spent traveling to a special assignment.  
Id. (footnote omitted).  In addition, if an employee was laid off during the time when he may have 
received a contract-signing bonus, the arbitrator may award that as part of the make-whole award as 
well.  Id. 
117. Id. at 1205. 
118. Id. at 1202–03. 
119. Id. at 1202 n.69.  Another example includes requiring the employer to provide insurance 
coverage for retired employees.  Id. at 1203 n.80. 
120. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 601 (6th Cir. 2004); Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C 
1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007). 
121. Ricco, 377 F.3d at 601. 
122. Id. at 600, 605–06. 
123. Savage, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *6–9. 
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beyond what those hours are worth monetarily.  Those hours represent 
seniority, retirement benefits, pension benefits, and here, eligibility for FMLA 
leave.
124
 
The arbitrator in Ricco reinstated Ricco with ―full credit for years of 
service for seniority and pension purposes.‖125  The court noted that often in 
back-pay awards an employer compensates an employee for overtime work 
the employee would have performed (but did not) as a result of the 
―employer‘s violation of employment laws.‖126  Even the court in Plumley 
acknowledged that the employee received compensation in the arbitration 
award for lost wages and benefits.
127
 Compensation for lost wages is payment 
for hours the employee would have worked, but did not, due to the violation 
of employment laws by the employer.  To allow an employee to be paid for 
work he has not performed, and include those hours in calculating pension or 
retirement benefits, yet exclude the hours from calculating eligibility for 
FMLA leave is incongruous.  Adhering to the principle of making an injured 
employee whole requires crediting those hours to the injured employee, and 
whatever benefit they represent, whether the benefit involves retirement plans, 
pension plans, seniority, or the calculation of an employee‘s eligibility for 
leave under the FMLA. 
B.  Ambiguity in How the FLSA Defines the FMLA—Open to Interpretation 
Another reason courts should include the hours a wrongfully terminated 
employee would have worked in determining FMLA eligibility is that the 
FLSA seems ambiguous as it relates to this issue, and any ambiguities should 
be resolved in favor of the employee.  Congress enacted the FLSA in June 
1938,
128
 and the FLSA remains the most important wage and hour legislation 
ever written.
129
  The FLSA has three main parts.  Along with establishing a 
minimum wage, it also requires employers to pay their employees a premium 
 
124. See Ricco, 377 F.3d at 600, 605–06 (demonstrating that a make-whole award recognizes 
the value of hours worked beyond their monetary value). 
125. Id. at 601 (citations omitted). 
126. Id. at 605. 
127. Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 2002). 
128. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060; Jennifer 
Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 535 
(2001). 
129. See id.  When Congress enacted the FLSA, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that the 
FLSA was ―perhaps ‗the most . . . far-sighted program [adopted] for the benefit of workers.‘‖  Id. 
(quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Party Primaries (June 24, 1938), in THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 391, 392 (Macmillian 1941)). 
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rate for overtime work.
130
  In addition, the Act imposes child labor limits on 
employers.
131
 
According to § 202(a) of the FLSA, the Act‘s purpose is to improve the 
conditions detrimental to workers‘ minimum standard of living.132  The Act 
seeks to improve conditions that are necessary for health, general well-being, 
and efficiency.
133
  Congress enacted the FLSA as part of the humanitarian 
legislation that was adopted during the Great Depression, and the Act has a 
remedial purpose.
134
  The Supreme Court, in Tennessee Coal, Iron and 
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123,
135
 explained that the FLSA provides 
no precise statutory definition of work or employment.
136
  However, the Court 
stated that because the FLSA is a remedial statute and humanitarian in its 
purpose, the FLSA should not be interpreted narrowly or applied 
grudgingly.
137
  The Court stated that the FLSA was designed to protect the 
rights of workers who ―sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to 
the use and profit of others.‖138 
The FMLA directs courts to § 207 of the FSLA when interpreting whether 
a worker has met the ―hours of service‖ requirement.139  In addition, the Code 
of Federal Regulations
140
  specifically states that the FLSA gives no definition 
of ―work‖ but only a partial definition of ―hours of service‖ as it relates to 
clothes-changing and wash-up time.
141
  Also, the Code of Federal Regulations 
states that courts are to provide the ultimate interpretation of the FLSA.
142
 
As a result, the FLSA contains an ambiguity as to the interpretation and 
definition of ―work.‖143  The FMLA offers no clarification when it directs 
 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 535–36. 
132. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000). 
133. Id. 
134. Clemons, supra note 128, at 553. 
135. 321 U.S. 590 (1944). 
136. Id. at 597. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c) (2006). 
140. The Code of Federal Regulations ―is the codification of the general and permanent rules 
published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government. . . . Each volume of the CFR is updated once each calendar year and is issued on a 
quarterly basis.‖ Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): Main Page, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008). 
141. 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2006). 
142. 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (2006). 
143. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944), superseded 
in part by Portal-to-Portal Act, Pub. L. No. 80-49, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 86 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 254 
(2000)), as recognized in Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1152 (D. Or. 
2007). 
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litigants to the FLSA to define ―work.‖144  Because the Code of Federal 
Regulations directs the courts to interpret the FLSA, the question becomes 
how the courts will interpret this ambiguity.  As demonstrated by the 
conflicting case law,
145
 the definition of work determines the FMLA 
eligibility of a wrongfully terminated, and subsequently reinstated, employee. 
In Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co., the Supreme Court gave 
guidance to courts when interpreting the FLSA.
146
  The Supreme Court 
admonished courts to construe the FLSA in a humanitarian fashion, not 
grudgingly.
147
  Applying a broad interpretation to the FMLA‘s hours of 
service requirement seems consistent with both the Code of Federal 
Regulations and the Supreme Court‘s admonishment in Tennessee Coal, and 
allows for the FLSA‘s humanitarian purpose to be accomplished.148  
Interpreting the hours of service requirement to include the hours a 
wrongfully terminated employee would have worked but for the wrongful 
termination reflects more accurately the Court‘s interpretation of the FLSA in 
Tennessee Coal.
149
 
The argument has been made that the FLSA should no longer enjoy the 
broad construction of its terms that courts have allowed in the past.
150
  Part of 
the argument is that because the nation no longer has the widespread 
unemployment problem of the Great Depression, the history and the purpose 
of the FLSA are inapplicable to current labor and employment issues.
151
  
Consequently, the FLSA has changed little over the years, while the 
workplace has changed considerably from when the FLSA was enacted, 
leaving courts to wonder if the remedial and humanitarian purpose has any 
validity in today‘s workplace.152 
Although technological advances and the global economy have changed 
the face of the modern workplace, and workers no longer live in the lean 
times of the Great Depression, the argument that courts should more narrowly 
construe the FLSA as a result does not recognize the challenges faced by a 
modern workforce.  Considering the fact that more of the American workforce 
is being replaced by foreign workers,
153
 and more of the products that 
 
144. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2004). 
145. See supra Part III. 
146. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 597. 
147. Id. 
148. See Clemons, supra note 128, at 553. 
149. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R Co., 321 U.S. at 597. 
150. See Clemons, supra note 128, at 554. 
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 556. 
153. The Chicago Tribune reported that digital technology and low-paid foreign workers are 
replacing workers in jobs that pay well but do not necessarily require a college degree.  Michael 
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compete for the American dollar are manufactured by foreign countries,
154
 the 
workplace is becoming an increasingly unpredictable place.  Even though the 
FLSA was enacted over sixty years ago, its purpose and history have validity 
and are applicable to today‘s workers.  In light of the changes in the 
workforce in the last sixty-plus years, courts should acknowledge that those 
changes reinforce the reasons why the FLSA should be liberally construed to 
protect today‘s workers, as it has protected past workers, especially as the 
FLSA is interpreted to better define the language of the FMLA. 
C.  Public Policy Arguments: Balancing the Needs of Employers and 
Employees When Interpreting the FMLA 
Public policy arguments support each side of the FMLA‘s hours worked 
controversy.  On the one hand, public policy favors employers and their needs 
in order for employers to be competitive in the global marketplace.  On the 
other hand, public policy favors supporting stable families, especially 
considering the ever-changing face of the American family.  The following 
public policy arguments show the issues involved when a court must balance 
the needs of employers and employees when interpreting the FMLA.  
Ultimately, courts should interpret the hours worked requirement as it relates 
to wrongfully terminated, reinstated employees in favor of employees because 
of their more vulnerable position as compared to employers. In addition, 
favoring the needs of employees seems congruent with the purposes and 
intent of Congress when enacting the FMLA. 
1.  Considering the Needs of the Employers When Interpreting the FMLA 
When looking at the FMLA from the employer‘s perspective, an 
employment law attorney stated that ―it‘s probably the most employer-hostile 
piece of legislation there is.‖155  The FMLA has also been described as a 
―nightmare‖ for employers who are trying to adhere to its requirements.156  In 
addition, an employer who tries to conserve valuable resources and set a good 
example for other employees has little recourse against an inadequate 
employee who holds up the FMLA as a shield against termination or a 
disciplinary action.
157
 
 
Oneal, Look High and Look Low to Find Next Year’s Jobs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2004, Zone C, at 3.   
In addition, in a computerized world, employers are increasingly using ―bits and bytes‖ to produce a 
greater number of goods and services with fewer people.  Id. 
154. See id. 
155. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 138. 
156. Id. at 139. 
157. See id. at 139–40. 
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Another strike against employers, related to the FMLA, is that it puts 
employers at a disadvantage if an FMLA case goes to trial.
158
  Juries are very 
often composed of an employee‘s peers, rather than fellow employers.159  
Plaintiffs win the vast majority of jury trials because of the bias in 
employment litigation.
160
  An employer will likely have a better outcome by 
avoiding litigation.
161
 
Interpreting the hours of service requirement to include the hours an 
employee would have worked during a wrongful termination may further 
disadvantage the employer in favor of the employee.  The FMLA specifically 
states that the goal of the FMLA is to balance the needs of the employer and 
the employee,
162
 yet there is little evidence in the way of case law that shows 
support for employers when interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service 
requirement.  Apart from Plumley and Barthelet, most courts that have 
weighed in on this issue have sided with the employee.
163
  Employers may 
feel that in a balancing act involving the FMLA, the scales are dramatically 
tipped to the employees‘ side. 
However, if employment is viewed through the lens of the common law 
―at will‖ employment concept, the scales seem more heavily tipped in favor of 
the employer.  The idea of employment at will gives the employer the 
discretion to hire and discharge employees for the benefit of the employer.
164
  
When looking at the history of employment and the power position employers 
have enjoyed, the FMLA and the FLSA seem necessary to give employees at 
least a modicum of job security and stability.
165
  Interpreting the hours of 
service requirement to include the hours a wrongfully terminated employee 
would have worked follows naturally if courts continue to protect employees. 
Courts can protect the interests of the employer when they strictly enforce 
the statutory numerical limits under the FMLA.
166
  In Plumley, the court 
deferred to the legislative boundaries set by Congress in requiring an 
employee to accrue 1250 hours of service before becoming eligible for FMLA 
leave.
167
  The court found that interpreting the phrase ―hours of service‖ to 
mean hours of ―actual‖ work fit within Congress‘s purposes in passing the 
 
158. See id. at 142. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 137–38. 
163. E.g., Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 600 (6th Cir. 2004). 
164. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137 n.23. 
165. See id. at 137. 
166. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002). 
167. Id. 
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FMLA.
168
  The court went on to note that if Congress had wanted to include 
unproductive time spent by an employee pursuing a grievance, it could have 
written the FMLA statute to include those hours.
169
  Accordingly, the Plumley 
court reasoned that because Congress did not specifically address those 
unproductive hours, the court refused to read those hours into the meaning of 
the hours of service requirement.
170
 
Employers would argue that courts have difficulty in making a ―principled 
distinction between wages received for hours not worked because an 
employer has failed to provide sufficient work and wages received for hours 
not worked because an employer unjustifiably has kept the employee from 
working (and, thus, has failed to provide sufficient work).‖171 Because of this 
difficulty, the employers would argue that courts may find that the hours of 
service requirement must include only hours ―actually‖ worked.172  In 
Plumley, the court looked at the FLSA‘s language to interpret the FMLA‘s 
phrase ―hours of service.‖173  Among the FLSA‘s exclusions from the regular 
rate for employment were wages paid for failure by the employer to provide 
the employee with regular work.
174
  The court in Plumley reasoned that the 
back pay and benefits received by the employee for the time he spent 
unlawfully suspended was consistent with the language in the FLSA that 
excluded those hours from counting toward an employee‘s regular rate and 
precluded those hours from counting toward an FMLA claim.
175
 
In addition, employers may claim that if courts allow employees to use the 
hours they ―could have‖ worked, rather than hours they ―actually‖ worked, 
courts will be expanding the meaning of hours of service beyond what 
Congress intended when enacting the FMLA.  Employers may claim that a 
broad interpretation of hours of service unreasonably favors the employee‘s 
needs over the employer‘s interests.  In addition, employers would argue that 
courts should consider that an employer‘s success in the marketplace, which 
in turn translates into more jobs for workers, is dependant upon a reliable 
 
168. Id. 
169. Id.  Plumley argued here that Congress‘s intent in requiring 1250 hours of work was to 
protect employers from having to provide part-time workers with FMLA coverage and only cover 
full-time workers.  Id.  The court in Plumley found that the argument was not based upon solid 
footing in that Congress chose to differentiate between eligible and ineligible employees by requiring 
a certain number of hours worked in the previous twelve months.  Id.  Further, the court in Plumley 
did not want to usurp Congress‘s policy-making authority by replacing legislative judgment with 
judicial judgment.  Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 370. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
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workforce.  If courts credit employees with hours they have not ―actually‖ 
worked, the reliability of employers‘ workforces will be undermined, forcing 
employers to hold open jobs that could be filled by workers who will help 
strengthen companies and help create a more stable economy. 
2.  Considering the Needs of Employees When Interpreting the FMLA 
Congress specifically enacted the FMLA out of an acknowledgment that 
the changing face of society‘s workforce required an added measure of 
protection for the needs of workers with families.
176
  The growth of single-
parent homes, the workforce taking retirement at later ages, and the needs of 
fathers staying at home to help with new infants all contributed to the 
formation of the FMLA.
177
  The structure and purpose of the FMLA would be 
unnecessary if employers were completely benevolent in meeting their 
employees‘ needs.  However, while employers are not always amenable to 
employee needs, employers are not necessarily tyrants.  In reality, employers 
generally try to run successful businesses in a competitive, global 
marketplace.
178
  The FMLA provides a structure and a framework for ensuring 
that employees can take the time they may require when a family or medical 
need necessitates their absence from work.  However, the FMLA is a 
―federally mandated exception to the common law concept of employment at 
will‖179 and holds the employer accountable to act scrupulously toward those 
employees who need FMLA leave. 
Congress‘s intent in enacting the FMLA was ―to balance the demands of 
the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and 
economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving 
family integrity.‖180  Congress specifically stressed that the goal of the FMLA 
was to promote and protect the financial security of families and linked the 
security of families with the interests of the nation.
181
  Although Congress 
 
176. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 135. 
177. See id. at 135–38. 
178. See Doebele v. Sprint Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1220 n.36 (D. Kan. 2001) (quoting 
Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 245, 253–54 (D.D.C. 1995)).  In Doebele, an employment 
discrimination case involving the ADA and the FMLA, the court commented that employees cannot 
use Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints to interfere with employers‘ rights to 
terminate an employee who is not adequately performing.  Id.  The court went on to state that if 
poorly performing employees were required to stay on an employer‘s payroll, businesses would not 
be able to compete in the global marketplace.  Id. 
179. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137.  ―Although employment at will is still the 
presumptive rule of law governing employer-employee relationships, ‗trends on the national level, 
confirm the decline of employment at will as inflexible doctrine.‘‖  Id. at 137 n.23 (quoting Robert J. 
Aalberts & Lorne Seidman, The Employment at Will Doctrine: Nevada’s Struggle Demonstrates the 
Need for Reform, 43 LAB. L.J. 651, 651–52 (1992)). 
180. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 14, at 137–38. 
181. Id. 
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recognized a need to balance the needs of the workplace with the needs of 
families,
182
 the fact that Congress did not address the need to protect the 
economic security of employers may show that Congress was acknowledging 
the power position that employers hold over their employees.  This should be 
a message to courts that when interpreting the FMLA, protecting families is a 
foremost concern, whether the interpretation involves the hours of service 
requirement or any other provision of the FMLA. 
In Ricco, the employee argued that the court needed to balance the 
demands of the workplace with the needs of families and to discourage 
employers from terminating employees for the purpose of restricting 
employees‘ eligibility to take FMLA leave.183  The court agreed and stated 
that if hours that an employee would have worked were not included in the 
calculation of the requisite 1250 hours needed to qualify for FMLA leave, 
employers would be rewarded for their unlawful conduct.
184
  The court in 
Ricco followed the intent of Congress to protect families‘ financial security 
and the national interest in the integrity of families by sending the clear 
message to employers that interfering with the FMLA rights of employees 
would not be allowed.
185
 
Likewise, in Densmore, when the court denied summary judgment on the 
basis that a jury could find that the employee‘s first unlawful termination 
interfered with the employee‘s right to take FMLA leave, the court aligned 
itself with the intent of Congress to protect families.
186
 
The court in Savage also demonstrated the intent of Congress when it 
determined that the employee‘s hours of service should include the hours the 
employee would have worked but for the termination without cause within the 
prior twelve months.
187
 
Conversely, the court in Plumley took the position of protecting the 
employer, rather than protecting families by interpreting the hours of service 
requirement to exclude the hours the employee would have worked while 
participating in the company‘s grievance procedure.188  Although the court 
acknowledged the employee‘s argument that the purpose of the FMLA is a 
remedial one to protect employees, the court went on to dismiss the argument 
 
182. Id. 
183. Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2004). 
184. Id. at 605. 
185. See id. at 600. 
186. See Densmore v. Pilgrim‘s Pride Corp., No. 4:05CV00770-WRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
82285, at *20–30 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 9, 2006). 
187. Savage v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 06 C 1407, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17605, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 9, 2007). 
188. See Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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as an oversimplification.
189
  Instead, the court chose to focus on discerning the 
intent of Congress in its wording of the FLSA and what defines ―work.‖190  
Even though the Code of Federal Regulations states that the FLSA does not 
clearly define ―work,‖191 the court fashioned a definition, then claimed that 
Congress intended the word ―work‖ to have the meaning the Plumley court 
gave it.
192
  The court in Plumley largely ignored the clearly expressed intent of 
Congress when enacting the FMLA and instead focused on the hypothetical 
intent of Congress when enacting the FLSA.
193
  Although the Code of Federal 
Regulations places the interpretation of the FLSA‘s language squarely within 
the discretion of the courts,
194
 it seems unlikely that Congress would have 
written either the FLSA or the FMLA with the notion that the courts would 
choose the intent of one act over the intent of another, especially the intent of 
the former legislation over the intent of the later-enacted legislation. 
If courts want to stay true to the intent and purpose of the FMLA, that is, 
to protect families while balancing the needs of both families and employers, 
they should interpret the hours of service requirement to include the hours an 
employee would have worked but for the wrongful termination.  Anything 
less will motivate employers to commit egregious acts of FMLA interference 
against their employees.  This is a violation of the intent of Congress to 
protect families‘ economic security. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The interpretation and application of the FMLA has created confusion for 
employees and employers alike as it relates to the wrongfully terminated, and 
subsequently reinstated, employee. Despite the confusion, the FMLA is a 
valuable piece of legislation for workers and their families, and courts should 
interpret the hours worked requirement for the reinstated employee based 
upon making the employee whole.  An employee who was wrongfully 
terminated and then reinstated cannot be made whole without being credited 
for the hours he would have worked but for the wrongful termination. 
In addition, although the FMLA imposes burdens on employers, those 
burdens are not unreasonable in light of the history of employment law and 
the goals and purposes Congress sought to meet with the FMLA‘s enactment.  
Courts should make decisions consistent with the goals of protecting workers 
with families while balancing the needs of employers and employees.  
 
189. Id. at 372 n.6. 
190. Id. at 369. 
191. 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2006). 
192. See Plumley, 303 F.3d at 370–72. 
193. See id. 
194. 29 C.F.R. § 785.2 (2006). 
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Interpreting the FMLA‘s hours of service requirement to include the hours an 
employee would have worked while he was wrongfully terminated furthers 
both the purpose and intent of the FMLA.  The needs of employers for a 
stable workforce cannot outweigh the needs of employees who would have 
met the requirements of the FMLA but for employers‘ initial wrongful 
termination. 
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